Climate Change, C&C and Africa
Paul Collier
Director, Centre for the Study of African Economies,
Oxford University
Gordon Conway
Imperial College London and Chief Scientist,
UK Department for International Development
Tony Venables
Oxford University and Chief Economist,
UK Department for International Development.
6th May 2008.
Under an idealised cap and trade emissions trading scheme each citizen
would be endowed with a right to emit a specified quantity of CO2e (or
each country endowed with the corresponding national total) and would be
able to sell rights in excess of own emissions. Were emissions
monitorable at the level of the individual citizen or country, such a
scheme would provide incentives for reductions in CO2e.
Depending upon the allocation of emissions rights it might also create a
distinct channel for resource flows to low emission countries. In the
hypothetical extreme in which each person was endowed with the same
emission rights, the financial flows to Africa resulting from sales of
carbon rights might be of comparable size to its current aid receipts of
around $40bn pa.14 In effect, the allocation of carbon rights to Africa
would become its aid programme. The abrupt creation of such valuable
rights without reference to existing patterns of usage is, of course,
entirely implausible.
Somewhat more realistically, ‘contraction and convergence’ schemes
propose national emissions quotas that would start from current levels
and very slowly converge – over several decades — to being proportional
to population. Since, over this time frame international economic
convergence would substantially reduce disparities in usage, the
redistributive aspect of carbon trading would be correspondingly
reduced.
